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ABSTRACT
In the article, it is proposed that the collapse of Soviet society was 
presaged by a growing crisis in late Soviet morality. On the periphery 
of late Soviet morality, collective cultural practices are seen to have 
successfully functioned based on a limited ethics of virtue. In the 
absence of an alternative to Soviet ideology, social regulation started 
to draw upon values intended for the reproduction of local communities. 
A growing contradiction between the limited values of the new social 
class/corporate entities and the need to develop universal values for a 
big society is currently the key ideological legitimation problem facing 
the Russian political order.
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Introduction
In the present article, we discuss the nature of the post-Soviet moral and social order 
and consider why such a moral and political scenario transpired. In this context, 
despite having undergone significant transformations, Soviet morality continues to 
play an important role in structuring the values that form present Russian society.
In critiques of contemporary Russian society, negative metaphors of quasi-class 
stratification, neopatrimonialism and neo-feudalism are often deployed to indicate 
the non-modern, non-market nature of post-Soviet social stratification. A deeper 
examination of these metaphors may support a relatively consistent elucidation of 
the source of values inherited from the past, along with a plausible prognostication 
of the evolutionary vectors of Russian social morality. Ultimately, the origin and 
transformation of the norms and values pertaining to social classes can be explained 
partly in terms of the unchanged expectations of the members of these classes, partly 
in terms of changes in these expectations.
On the other hand, the neo-classist metaphor on the whole reflects aspects 
of the social reality of modern Russia that only superficially resemble the class – or 
estates – structure. In any case, this form is quite distinct from the traditional forms 
of social stratification, if only in terms of the normative content it structures. Indeed, 
while already in the USSR it was possible to speak of quasi-classes – since these 
structures could, if desired, reveal intra-class values, norms, codes of honour, etc. – 
contemporary quasi-classifications resemble them only from the point of view of 
the administrative hierarchy. Thus, this social stratification can be seen as a purely 
pragmatic construct, aimed at justifying the existing public resource distribution 
hierarchy. Since intra-class values can be found only in the higher, governing 
classes, periodical attempts to formulate codes of honour, e.g. codes of ethics for 
officials etc., can be witnessed in the so-constructed universum. While, from the 
perspective of the hierarchical distribution of resources, the rest of the political elites 
may be treated as dependent classes, they do not consider themselves to be bound 
by class codes of honour, but instead can be seen to subscribe to the apparently 
popular versions of nationalism and patriotism. From a moral point of view, a neo-
classist society presents a depressing picture in which, in being openly reduced to 
the rights of the strong, social relations are simultaneously stripped of their romantic 
veneer. This represents a version of an atomised society in which the formation of 
social groups having a distinct collective identity and morality is prevented by the 
will of the authorities or the repayment of loans acting as a universal regulator of 
behaviour (see: Dragunsky, 2019).
However, no society or its morality can be objectively described in exclusively 
negative terms, i.e. in terms of what is not there. Thus, since no society is hell on earth, 
the same norms and values do not necessarily generate rogue or unmeritorious 
institutions and practices. From this follows a basis for possible hope. In the present 
article, we analyse the cultural and ideological formation process of high, universal 
Soviet morality, leading to the construction of the communist personality along with 
the destruction of previous class-based values, barriers and practices. In so doing, 
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we see that the high moral goals set out during the implementation of the Soviet 
project were only partially achieved as a consequence of many cultural-historical 
and ontological obstacles encountered along the way. These transformations of 
Soviet morality, largely taking place as a consequence of the internal evolutionary 
logic of the Soviet project, resulted in a kind of moral bear market, in which the 
utopian goals of the Communists gradually came to be devalued by the new values 
of the consumer society. Thus, already by the late Soviet period, the value systems 
of private and corporate interests had begun to contrast themselves more actively 
with official morality and public interests, clandestinely preparing the cultural ground 
for the transition to a new social state.
Homo Sovieticus: Crafty Slave or Victim of Deceit?
Today we are witnessing the gradual loss of the Soviet idea as an independent value 
through its transformation into symbolic material for present struggles, in which the 
validity of the Soviet experience is either asserted or denied. Due to the politics 
of memory, completely opposing ideological perspectives of view on the Soviet 
phenomenon are legitimised: on the one hand, standing for repressive totalitarianism; 
on the other, representing the avant-garde of humanity, by which means the global 
understanding of the situation of the working classes was transformed, resulting in 
the development of a welfare state in all modern societies. Accordingly, subjects of 
such retrospective value constructions place their Soviet personal, family and group 
experiences in fundamentally opposing ideological containers without interference 
or hesitation, marking all contradictions and objections as insignificant exceptions 
to this experience. However, the much more subtle, complex, historically variable 
and contradictory value structures actually existing at all cultural levels and in all 
communities during Soviet times is not reducible to the official hierarchy of higher 
values. Consequently, it is not justified to reduce the historical phenomenon of the 
Soviet project or the value motivation of various social groups within it to ideological 
caricatures; even less so, to interpret this experience in terms of deviations from the 
universal path of human development as described by mainstream contemporary 
economic and political discourses.
It is generally understood that a sharp moral transformation occurred within 
Soviet society during the late 1980s and early 1990s. In any case, it seemed so due to 
the suddenness of the transition; as Alexei Yurchak laconically put it, “everything was 
forever, until it was no more” (Yurchak, 2014). Although the transition can hardly be 
said to have occurred easily, it is not necessarily the case that the social catastrophe 
was accompanied by a moral catastrophe. Even if they did not find their market niche 
from the outset, the majority of people did not generally have to make a huge effort 
to get over themselves in order to adapt to a new way of life. Of course, this does not 
imply that all citizens at once rushed to join the mafia and kill each other; on the other 
hand, they turned out to be surprisingly tolerant of those who did do this. While such 
behaviour was not condoned in terms of morality, neither did it necessarily provoke an 
outspoken rejection; at times, excuses were even made for it.
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On the other hand, from the point of view of officially declared values, the 
difference between the Soviet before and the post-Soviet now appeared significant. 
A similar consideration arises when considering relations between people in everyday 
life: during the 1990s, many suddenly realised that in terms of human relations, Soviet 
life had been quite tolerable. There had been more trust, warmth, mutual assistance, 
etc. – and where had all this gone?
To the last question, domestic and foreign social scientists gave two main 
answers, in equal measure ideological and crudely one-dimensional.
The first was that Soviet people themselves were irredeemably duplicitous and 
hypocritical. Advocates of this point of view were not shy to express themselves; for 
them, Soviet society comprised a colony of three hundred million slaves for which 
there were neither moral values, nor religious – only propaganda and ideology 
constructed on lies and hypocrisy (see: Panfilov, 2016). As A. Yurchak notes, in 
emphasising the categories of universal duplicity, lies, bribery, denunciation and 
immorality as basic principles in the relations of Soviet people with the system and 
each other, the authors construct a new binary model in which the lies and immorality 
of the “socialist subject” are opposed to the integrity and honesty of some other, 
unnamed, “normal” subject (obviously a liberal subject) (see Yurchak, 2014, p. 44). 
In other words, in order to account for what grew out of it, it is necessary only to 
note that the Soviet moral climate was already sufficiently permeated by evil. Thus, 
Homo Sovieticus can be conveniently described in negative categories: in the first 
place, he lacks a sense of his own self-worth, which is either substituted either with 
pusillanimity or arrogance. In yielding to totalitarian oppression, the Soviet people 
said one thing on the record, but another in private; they swore public allegiance 
to various values and ideals, while in their hearts they nurtured something quite 
different. Thus, it was clear that, with the advent of freedom, these slothful servants 
of the regime quickly showed their true faces and behaved accordingly; the majority 
of them turning out to be philistine, greedy and self-serving, with only a minority 
turning out to be simultaneously civilised and liberal. However, such explanations 
were based on rather simplistic ideas about Soviet realities and human behaviour. 
In addition, retrospective ideologisation must be taken into account: recalling their 
lives in Soviet times, those whose standpoint is distanced by hindsight tend to be 
unreliable eyewitnesses, instead ascribing to their past selves the views and motives 
of the present (see Yurchak, 2005, pp. 42–43).
In other words, the present-day critics of Soviet society did not necessarily 
perceive their contemporaneous Soviet reality as a totally immoral hell in which 
they were forced to hide their true faces. Indeed, we can assume that it was exactly 
this binary narrative featuring dissembling slothful servants that was accepted after 
the fact, when it was necessary to explain and justify how morally decent people 
seemingly left to their own devices (i.e. not under compulsion), arranged at first wild 
capitalism with criminal revolution, followed by an atomised society characterised by 
a low level of interpersonal and institutional trust. The starting point of the discussion 
consists in the thesis that, if Soviet society had consisted of decent and worthy people, 
then it could not have reached such a moral nadir in terms of everyday (and political) 
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life. For this type of detractor, the after-fact of evil always and only grows out of evil. 
Thus, it was only natural for them to convince themselves that the society to which 
they had given the best years of their lives was never morally sound, being comprised 
of individuals and collectives that to some extent resembled moral freaks – with the 
exception, of course, of the few critics themselves, who were either at that time not like 
all the others, or else came to see the light later, belatedly realising all the immorality 
of their former existence.
The second simplistic response was based on the idea of a single value model, 
which formed the moral basis of the overwhelming majority of Soviet people, as 
well as the idea of a highly moral and highly cultured society, which, with the 
beginning of reforms, was subjected to forced degradation. The reformers lowered 
the threshold of society’s sensitivity to social pathology. Since the 1990s, public 
immoralism has begun to spread in the country; there has been a looting of the 
state accompanied by a total erosion of culture and morality (see: Simonyan, 2011). 
And, if moral degradation has not yet swept all before it, this is only because it 
encounters the resistance of traditional Russian values, which found support and 
substantial development in the Soviet period of history (see: Rutkevich, 1998, 
p. 9). Or, as Sergei G. Kara-Murza wrote, since the end of the 1980s, Russia has 
been carrying out a comprehensive and well-developed relativisation programme, 
followed by the dismantlement of moral standards and prohibitions and the 
introduction of radically amoral values (see: Kara-Murza, 2005, p. 546). From this, 
it followed that Soviet people with high moral virtues had been cynically deceived. 
Appealing to their moral feelings, as well as partly to ideologies, malefactors from 
the foreign and domestic elites were able to connect high moral ideals and ideas 
about a worthy life with an anti-Soviet project, i.e. capitalism. By the time they 
realised their mistake, it was too late. This answer already looked somewhat more 
plausible, since it was based on the well-known facts of the manipulation of public 
consciousness in the era of perestroika and Yeltsin’s reforms. Nevertheless, it 
remains difficult to believe that, through manipulation alone, it was possible to turn 
black into white, to seduce people of a highly moral and highly cultured society, 
forcing them to exercise comparative tolerance with respect to the moral realities 
of the Great Criminal Revolution. After all, as Abraham Lincoln said, you cannot 
fool all the people all the time. And, most importantly, why did this period become 
a moral disaster only for a relatively small number of alarmists, while the majority 
survived it with relative sanguinity?
It is not difficult to notice that, despite all the differences, both of these answers 
proceed from the observed fact that, during the 1990s, a sharp transition took place 
from a society that had some moral and cultural values to one having completely 
different values. Both answers are aimed at trying to explain the high speed of this 
transition, described in terms of a genuine collapse in moral values. But was it really 
like that? Having reason to doubt the above answers, we propose to outline the 
main features of a third. Of course, this alternative response cannot be considered 
exhaustive either; however, we hope that it avoids the gross oversimplification and 
limitations of the two already mentioned.
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A Soviet Upbringing… Based on Non-Soviet Models?
We will proceed from the fact that Soviet morality was not based on a single basic 
value model. At a minimum, it consisted of two-tiers; that is, like the morality of every 
big society, it consisted of universal principles combined with virtue ethics.
The highest universal principles of Soviet morality were determined by communist 
ideology, which in many respects was the continuation of a wider, progressive-
humanistic worldview having its roots in liberalism. Looking retrospectively at the 
evolution of the highest values of the Soviet political project, we can confidently say 
that it was based on the desire to actualise universal left utopias, intended not only 
for citizens of the USSR, but also for the rest of the world. This utopian ideological 
programme included the following elements: emancipation of working people from 
the rule of the bourgeois minority; the dismantlement of the estate structure in 
favour of civil equality; the expansion of social benefits addressed to the majority; 
egalitarianism; classical liberal ideas of the growth of opportunities for everyone 
and progress as a form of the unfolding of history; the value of the future; the world 
revolution as a catalyst for necessary social changes; and hence the original Bolshevik 
eschatology, later to be replaced by moderate ideas of the evolutionary superiority 
of socialism followed by peaceful coexistence. Thus, in the dynamics of its core of 
values, Soviet society appears as a leftist late-liberal revolutionary project that takes 
the reasons for the failures of the European revolutions of the first wave into account, 
whose political and economic results were largely attributed, on behalf of the Third 
Estate, to the bourgeois elites. While the party vertical of power played a key role in the 
management of Soviet society, the role of other authorities (the system of councils, the 
economic and judicial verticals, etc.) only decreased with distance from the revolution 
(Orekhovsky, 2019, p. 32). Thus, the Communist Party was responsible for the 
development, dissemination and control of the highest values that integrated Soviet 
society across all social boundaries and inequalities. At the political level, the values 
of Soviet society were purposefully inculcated with the help of various mechanisms 
of institutional implementation, functionally opening them for the majority. During the 
Soviet period, ideological bullishness was pushed at all levels of the social system, 
starting with a single hierarchy of media and ending with the organisation of special 
forms of collectivism (Party, Komsomol and pioneer meetings, political literacy 
lessons, meetings of labour collectives, community work days, demonstrations 
on public holidays calendar etc.), which were formed to support and reproduce the 
highest Soviet values.
It is true that, from a certain point of view, there was no Soviet social morality as 
such since, inasmuch as pre-revolutionary Russia did not manage to achieve a moral 
phenomenon similar to the Western model, the conditions for its formation in Soviet 
Russia were even less favourable (Gudkov, 2013, pp. 125–126). Adhering to a less 
radical point of view, some authors consider Soviet morality to be an inferior form of 
pseudo-morality (Zinoviev, 1994, p. 261), taking it as axiomatic that there should no 
place for ideology in the normal, which implies that morality and ideology should be 
kept separate (Stolyar, 2010, pp. 87–88). These authors assert that it is possible to 
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distinguish between ideological morality (or pseudo-morality) and personal morality 
(or actual, proper morality). Here ideological morality is subsumed into ideology, 
interpreting what a person in a communist society should be like and urging people to 
follow this model. Although such morality closely resembles real (personal) morality, in 
reality it only approximates to it to the same extent as communist ideology comprises 
a new form of religion (see: Zinoviev, 1994, pp. 261). 
Here we see the idea of a particular real or personal morality, which exists 
separately from ideology or religion. However, if such morality also exists somewhere, 
then this must consist in the familiar virtue ethics that is characteristic of local 
communities and undoubtedly forms the actual moral horizon for such authors.
Finally, such a distinction between true morality and Soviet pseudo-morality 
can never be made coherently, since the authors accept the need, if not for ideology, 
then for something analogous (typically religion) in order for the morality of modern 
society to coalesce into a necessarily complete form (i.e. serving to indicate the proper 
placement of virtue ethics). In particular, the inconsistencies in this position arise 
from its advocates’ excessive zeal to distinguish between ideology and morality. As 
Marina Stolyar notes, ultimately, people were interested not in ideology itself, but in 
its supporting pillars – morality, philosophy, art and especially religion – that allowed 
Soviet ideology to hold out for such a long time (see: Stolyar, 2010, p. 175). She states 
that too often in the last decades of its existence, Soviet ideology resorted to borrowing 
the energy of the “moral factor” for its own support. Here, in accepting that in its fall, the 
bankrupt system pulled down everything connected with it – so that the socialist moral 
crisis turned into a devaluation of morality in general. She argues that the opposition of 
ideology and morality ended in the fall of ideology and the victory of morality; however, 
it was a Pyrrhic victory (see: Stolyar, 2010, pp. 87–88).
In one sense, it can be agreed that a victory of morality really did occur following 
the collapse of the USSR. However, this should be seen in terms of a victory of one-
half of Soviet morality over the other, rather than morality in general over ideology. In 
our opinion, such confusion arises from the indistinguishability of universal morality 
and virtue ethics. To avoid this kind of confusion and inconsistency, we proceed from 
the realisation that the urge to distinguish between ideology and morality is not as 
productive as it might once have seemed. In the societies of Modernity, ideologies 
have long played a similar moral role to that formerly performed by religions; indeed, 
they are often with some justice referred to as civil religions (Fishman, 2014). 
Therefore, we see no reason not to accord such a full value to Soviet morality.
We consider that other major component of Soviet morality, virtue ethics, to 
focus on the values of commitment to the local, collective community, i.e. they do 
not claim universality and do not refer to the transcendent in any form, whether 
that be religious, ideological or ethical. This explains both the inevitability of virtue 
ethics and their limitations. Although clearly unsuitable for integrating individuals 
into a complex big society, virtue ethics are indispensable for creating the ties 
characteristic of a small community, without which the functioning of most social 
institutions remains unthinkable. However, being left to its own devices, a virtue 
ethics approach is equally (un)suitable for the Communist Party and the Christian 
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church, as well as for the gang, the mafia, or any of the other communities of friends 
fighting for a place under the sun that may arise during the crises that periodically 
afflict big societies. During the turning point of the 1990s, when the universal 
principles of Soviet morality crashed, ethics of virtue, suitable for various purposes 
including any social system, survived and remained popular. It was this that made 
the Criminal Revolution acceptable to the majority.
Secondly, it should be borne in mind that the Soviet project entailed elevating 
man through culture, proceeding from the fact that it has historically been the case 
that the poor are poor and the rich are rich, but this must be done away with. The 
rich must be punished, while the poor must be accustomed to the idea that their 
poverty will be replaced not with coveted wealth, but by high leisure (see: Cantor, 
2011, p. 211). As evidenced by numerous artistic experiments that completely 
denied the pre-revolutionary achievements of Russian culture, Soviet culture began 
with a promise to give the people a kind of new heaven on a new earth. However, 
over time, radical cultural experiments gave way to a more realistic strategy of 
mastering the cultural heritage of mankind, which turned out to be valuable for the 
cause of Communism. According to Konstantin Bogdanov, the arguments of Lenin 
and Trotsky about the world revolution, which justified the herostratic attitudes of the 
cultural elite of the twenties, already looked like an anachronism by the mid-thirties. 
By the mid-1930s, futurological utopias as represented in literature and art became 
balanced and gradually replaced by historical retrospection, designed to present 
the present as a logical outcome of previous history, which, over its entire course, 
“dialectically” prepared the ground for the flourishing of Stalin’s rule (see: Bogdanov, 
2009, pp. 107–108).
As a result, the area of historical dynamics of Soviet morality that interests us 
has always been heterogeneous enough to allow (and even welcome) a number 
of ethical, personal and broadly cultural patterns that are not directly related 
to communist ideology, but borrowed from the area of universal human values. 
Objectively, a major role was played by attempts to integrate pre-revolutionary 
cultural achievements into the Soviet cultural hierarchy, including folklore (fairy tale, 
myth), as well as the ancient heroic epic and other elements borrowed from noble 
or bourgeois culture, not to mention science and technology. The success of the 
Soviet moral and cultural project depended both on the degree of subordination 
of Communist morality to virtue ethics, as well as on the integration of previous 
neoclassical and on other cultural paradigms. When this connection turned out to 
be strong, the values of virtue ethics began to glow with the reflected light of the 
universal moral values of the communist project – or, in its broader interpretation, 
the values of humanism, progress, beauty, goodness and truth. Although these 
values were kept in their place, in reality, their carriers tended to overestimate them, 
considering them to be self-sufficient. Conversely, to the extent that the connection 
between Communist morality and virtue ethics turned out to be weak and formal, 
Soviet morality and culture acquired a deep resemblance to other cultures – either 
bourgeois, or noble (in its heroic form, closest to virtue ethics), which was unable to 
effectively resist the Criminal Revolution.
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Based on the foregoing, it is necessary to acknowledge the content of those 
cultural strata (primarily literature) in which virtue ethics, heroic values and bourgeois 
morality, being never digested, were waiting in the wings.
The ethics of virtue is primarily associated with all kinds of literature that 
describe the acts of heroes. In the Soviet context, these heroes initially consisted 
of prominent actors of the revolution and subsequent civil war. This can be seen 
as indicative of an attempt to tame the heroic problematic. Thus, already by the 
1920s–1930s it was being acknowledged that the cult of heroes was not in itself 
something fundamentally socialist. To some extent, this cult was not very desirable, 
since, in its orthodox historical and materialistic interpretation, Marxism did not 
accord the same importance to the role of personality in history as bourgeois, feudal 
and even utopian-socialist. Soviet writers emphasised that the main basis of our 
heroism is a correct understanding of the consciousness of class duty and, at the 
same time, overcoming the fear of death, which leads the hero to victory, which 
should be shown by us as a natural embodiment of class duty as correctly understood 
(see: Bogdanov, 2009, p. 176). Therefore, in particular, a hero of the Civil War had to 
be a collective type of hero; although it was not necessary to pull out the hero from 
the mass, at the same time the mass should not be faceless. Here, it was necessary 
to show that the heroes were driven by class duty; the hero himself had to be of a 
proletarian background, not a fellow traveller, etc. (ibid., p. 177).
Whatever else might have been the case with the characters in Soviet literature, 
archetypes produced within the genre were insufficient on their own to form a basis 
for upbringing and education. Thus, the country of victorious socialism could not 
limit itself to educating its citizens solely on the example of heroic proletarians. The 
reason was banal: neither world nor domestic culture had in its repertoire enough 
sufficiently attractive and holistic samples of a harmoniously developed personality 
drawn entirely from the oppressed classes. However, these samples were abundant 
among the ruling classes, i.e. the aristocracy and the bourgeoisie, which historically 
had sufficient leisure time for personal self-improvement.
Despite Russian literature becoming highly critical of the nobility from the 
second half of the 19th century, increasingly describing them as a decadent, parasitic 
class, along with the aristocracy in general, they had already established patterns 
of a harmoniously developed individual, including personality and patriotism. Just as, 
at one time, such heroes were the subject of imitation by the bourgeoisie in Europe, 
they were to also become the model for emulation by Homo Sovieticus. An educated 
nobleman of the 18th century was characterised by such as definitions as “nobleness”, 
“service”, “honour”. Nobleness and honour were understood in terms of a person’s 
characteristics, the basis on which his reputation is earned. Service was understood 
as love for the Fatherland, duty and readiness for self-sacrifice. But wasn’t that also 
what was required from Homo Sovieticus? Thus, there was no essential contradiction 
between the figure of an ideal nobleman and the ideal of patriotic Soviet citizen.
Returning to the cultural meaning of the Soviet project, we once again note that 
it can be seen as largely consisting in equating citizens with the nobility on a moral 
level. Of course, this cultural transformation also implied the exclusion of all sorts of 
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material excesses and material inequality as a potential factor in personal and moral 
degradation. It is no coincidence, for example, that Soviet science fiction emphasised 
the asceticism of the people of the future, who understand that the endless expansion 
of material needs is meaningless, especially when it becomes an end in itself (Efremov, 
1957/2020). A specific cultural problem relating to the Soviet period concerned the 
definition of a sufficiently deserving level of needs, based on a kind of public consensus. 
In a certain sense, the Soviet cultural and educational project comprised a project to 
inculcate victorious workers into a high noble culture: according to Galina Ivankina, 
many people love the USSR for the aristocracy of its culture, its literacy and breadth. 
For those same Krapivin boys who turned out to be the refined heirs of the offspring of 
nobility with the same heightened sense of justice (see: Ivankina, 2015).
The bourgeois cultural influence on Soviet people was perhaps less noticeable 
due to the fact that Russian pre-revolutionary history did not allow the Russian 
bourgeoisie to survive the great and heroic times. Consequently, Russian culture 
lacks a holistic, heroic or positive personality model of bourgeois culture. However, 
the objective needs of modernisation resulted in the need to learn from the champions 
of such culture, i.e. Western capitalists.
Marxism recognised the great historical role of the bourgeoisie, which did not 
immediately become reactionary and corrupted. Therefore, at least in the early 
years of Soviet power, the Bolsheviks did not hesitate to openly take lessons from 
the bourgeoisie – not only technically, but also culturally in the broad sense of the 
word. It was not only Lenin or Gorky who called for this engagement, but also other 
Bolshevik leaders and cultural figures of a lower rank. Accordingly, it was not only their 
material and scientific achievements that should be borrowed from the capitalists, but 
also those character traits that contributed to the emergence of these achievements. 
Based on these borrowings, an extensive subculture arose to encompass those Soviet 
social strata that participated in military-political, cultural and economic competition 
with the West (Karacharovsky, Shkaratan, Yastrebov, 2015, pp. 86–87).
Paradoxically, in the field of upbringing and culture for bourgeois cultural 
discourse, things were not so bad in the USSR. Many of the foreign classics available 
to the Soviet reader contained images of bourgeois heroes, which, in the Soviet 
interpretation, were often served as of the people. Often these comprised images 
of heroic bourgeois – participants in revolutionary and liberation struggles (Till 
Eulenspiegel, The Gadfly, heroes in the works of Victor Hugo, etc.). The bourgeois was 
attractive not only as a revolutionary, but also as an active, purposeful entrepreneur 
and hero of labour – and even more so, as an adventurer, a gentleman of fortune. 
Although bourgeois economic science was condemned by Soviet ideological workers 
for being addicted to robinsonades, fictional characters like Robinson Crusoe himself 
or those inhabiting Jules Verne’s “Mysterious Island” were represented to enthusiastic 
young Soviet readers as heroes of labour. In authors such as Balzac, we encounter 
bourgeois characters like Gobseck, who, if not morally flawless, were at least colourful 
and not inferior to aristocrats in terms of the nobility and beauty of their souls. In general, 
the classical foreign literature of the 19th century often portrayed attractive patterns 
of interference of bourgeois and noble personality patterns (see: Ossovskaya, 1987, 
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pp. 427–460). In such cases, the Soviet reader could recognise in the bourgeois a 
social type who, like himself, strove for the sublime, as well as possessing attractive 
complexity and depth of personality. Even negative bourgeois characters like the 
Renaissance man archetype had bright personalities, which were welcomed by the 
intelligent reader, their transgressions instinctively forgiven.
In this connection, we cannot fail to note that all the above-described processes 
took place in the USSR against the background of the formation of an actual personality 
cult, which was initially formed in a framework bounded by ideological contingencies. 
However, towards to the end of the Soviet era, the practice of forming a personality by 
imitating heroes had mostly been left behind; moreover, it was not necessarily officially 
sanctioned (Kharkhordin, 2002, pp. 463–472). One of the characteristic symptoms of 
this process was a change in the teaching of literature at school, which is described 
as a process of liberation from the ideological standards of the interpretation of literary 
works. In this endeavour, more and more attention was paid to the inculcation of 
pure morality. As Evgeny Ponomarev states, more and more often teachers transfer 
morality to the everyday level, saving it from a loop of abstract ideologies. Thus, the 
history of Russian literature turned into a textbook of practical morality. This trend had 
existed before, but never taking such a complete and explicit form (see: Ponomarev, 
2017, p. 133).
In many respects, Soviet upbringing and education can be seen as having 
cultivated in a person either altogether bourgeois qualities or those attributable to the 
ethics of virtue, being independent of high communist ideals.
Informal Late Soviet Cultural Practices:
From the Renewal of Communism to Instrumental Ethics
It was not only in culture and in art that the highest form of communist morality in 
the Soviet project was undergoing rapid historical evolution. A variety of informal 
movements was also making a significant contribution to a critical rethinking and 
consequent weakening of official morality. Even more intensely, than in the small 
dissident groups that directly opposed the Soviet political system; these movements 
were involved in re-evaluating official Soviet morality, albeit without significant social 
support. Although not explicitly contradicting official ideology and morality, these 
informal cultural movements, which aimed at inculcating children and youth with 
cultural values according to various alternative canons, were engaged in stress testing 
the highest form of Soviet morality at the level of experimental cultural practices. 
These movements (Communard youth organisations, student song clubs, travel clubs, 
etc.) were quite numerous. In the USSR the amateur bard song movement alone 
had around 5 million members. There is reason to believe that the general vectors 
of the moral evolution of the participants in these movements were approximately 
equivalent – if only because they were presented with a similar range of choices 
in the directions of moral evolution, arising as responses to similar challenges and 
determined by similar constraints. From the point of view of ideology and morality, the 
informal social minority hardly differed in practical terms from the majority that did not 
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participate in such activities. Therefore, informal activities consisted in such a type 
of deviation from the ideological and moral norm (wider, from the norm of practical 
reason) that, at least in part, anticipated the moral transformation of the majority in the 
process of large-scale changes.
The status of informal movements in Soviet life remained uncertain. On the one 
hand, they were not illegal or oppositional in the literal sense of the word; therefore, 
participating in them cannot be attributed to the phenomenon of internal emigration. 
At various times, to a greater or lesser extent, they enjoyed the patronage of official 
structures. Conversely, ever-changing limits to their adoption were frequently imposed 
by Soviet officialdom.
What, for example, was the source of the increase in mutual alienation between 
Soviet officialdom and the Communards and other related movements? Alexander 
Shubin explains this in terms of the contradiction between the needs of industrial society, 
which was satisfied by the Soviet school, and the humanistic traditions of Russian 
culture, which developed under the slogan of the formation of the diverse personality: 
how many workers can be churned out – but society also needs a creative personality! 
(see: Shubin, 2008). It is difficult to give a comprehensive answer: individual fates, 
along with cultural, demographic, economic and other social transformations, were 
intertwined too closely at different stages of the history of the USSR, from which a 
different understanding of the essence of the social order, which was satisfied by the 
appearance of such movements, ensued. Informal movements were the result, on the 
one hand, of a recognition of the formalism and insufficiency of the Soviet education 
system, while on the other hand, they consisted in the objective result obtained 
within the Soviet educational paradigm when attempts were made to overcome its 
insufficiency. The Communard and related movements initially appeared in view of the 
need to provide a more solidly founded inculcation, a greater degree of consciousness 
than was objectively achieved within the framework of official education institutions. 
However, a greater degree of consciousness implied a significant degree of individual 
independence, which in many respects predetermined the logic of the evolution of the 
Communard and related associations. Regardless of the subjective wishes of their 
founders, these movements objectively responded to an already manifested need on 
the part of a significant number of individuals for a self-realisation and personal growth 
space, which was not being provided by officially sanctioned spaces.
The principal social paradox, which became apparent at the early stage of such 
movements, was that ideological involvement could only be successfully achieved 
within the framework of smaller social groups. This was due to their being fused with 
a virtue- or heroic ethic to a greater extent than could be achieved or afforded by the 
official system or indeed any big society. The key problem here was that the didactic 
techniques for cultivating virtues began to assume a greater significance than the two-
tier ethical paradigm implied. Over time, it became increasingly difficult in practice to 
combine such inculcated virtues with the high ideals of communism and humanism. 
In any case, the educators themselves did not find this necessary, instead, simply 
paying tribute to the formalities. For such educators, what became necessary – and, 
most importantly, comprehensible – was the education of creative personalities, 
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which at the same time cohered with emerging corporate structures and networks. 
This inevitably led to an increase in the role played by personality patterns alien to the 
Soviet state, both in the sense of class ideology and the techniques used to cultivate 
them. As a result, various kinds of moral collisions arose that were not objectively 
inculcated in the people of the communist future, but in some others committed to 
instrumental values, which later came to predetermine their comparatively conflict-
free entry into the era of markets and democracy.
It should be admitted here that socialism comprised a largely artificial system, 
which could retain its specificity only under the conditions of political, ideological and 
moral leadership of the ruling party. Socialism was impossible without the constant 
and relentless correction of the grey realities of everyday life by the efforts of ideology 
and culture, concentrated in the ideal. According to Evgeny Dobrenko, if we try to 
mentally subtract socialist realism from the picture of “socialism” – novels about 
enthusiasm in production, poems about joyful work, films about a happy life, songs 
and paintings about the wealth of the Soviet country, etc. – we will have nothing left that 
could be called socialism itself. There will be grey everyday life, routine daily work, an 
unsettled and difficult existence. In other words, since such a reality can be attributed 
to any other economic system, nothing remains of socialism in the sediment. We can 
therefore conclude that socialist realism produced the symbolic values of socialism 
rather than the reality of socialism (see: Dobrenko, 2007).
Consequently, the goal of communist education and the morality of lofty ideals 
resulting from it should have been closely intertwined from the outset with the cultivation 
of virtue- and heroic ethics required here and now, which typically became the moral 
limit of the education programmes carried out within the framework of socialist 
institutions and collectives. The secret lurking at the heart of socialism, therefore, 
consisted in the fact that no specific dominant socialist consciousness could exist in 
its presence: upon closer examination, such consciousness is decomposed into the 
moral equivalents of phenomena that occur in all class societies. At the same time, in 
order to avoid them conflicting with the same objective social development needs as 
understood by communism, a person had to achieve a high degree of understanding 
of his objective needs and desires.
However, in the collective practices of informal movements, relatively stable 
results in communist mass education were achieved not on the path of high 
consciousness gained by mastering Marxist-Leninist theory, but rather by applying 
well-known educational methods taking the form of not allowing free time, setting 
new goals and objectives, as well as involving participants in collective activities, 
etc. The turbulent history of the first half of the twentieth century itself contributed to 
such an educational approach. The result was a person brought up with a clear bias 
towards heroic and virtue ethics, in which such heroism and virtue were associated 
with the high ideals of communism and humanism by knowing their place rather than 
presenting themselves as intrinsically valuable. However, when the enthusiasts of the 
late 1950s, noticing the clear moral exhaustion of Soviet society, set out to achieve 
similar moral results to those obtained during the early Soviet period, they needed a 
form of organisation with an even greater degree of artificiality (since the heroic age 
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of the Soviet system had already passed): this form of organisation was the commune 
and its various analogues. The bias towards early Soviet practices was one of the 
reasons why the Soviet officialdom took a dual position in relation to communardism. 
In such communes, one could see a hidden reference to the days of Stalinist rule with 
their moral rigour and the potentially dangerous enthusiasm of indoctrinated adherents. 
Nevertheless, under the new conditions, the Stalinist methods increasingly objectively 
served not socialist goals, but rather to educate in the spirit of abstract humanism, 
resulting in the emergence of an almost openly bourgeois creative personality, albeit 
one hiding behind the fig leaf of Soviet ideology.
The communard experiment, as its enthusiasts intended, was originally aimed at 
educating a person in a communist society. Although it never sat very well with official 
communist values, in terms of inculcating the virtues necessary to achieve more 
modest intermediate goals it was much more successful. Here we touch on the other 
side of the moral problematic of the communard movement. Since communardism 
initially arose as a reaction to the incompleteness and inconsistency of communist 
education, it had to be guided by high values and goals. This implied a fairly serious 
tension in the disparity between the actual and the due. Nevertheless, simply in terms 
of ideology and other consciousness, the communardist education project did not 
imply anything specifically communist. The self-confidence – nowadays being taught 
on a large scale by coaches of various kinds – involved in the inculcation of a creative 
person and imposing a gratingly banal love for the people has a common place in a 
number of religious and moral teachings.
Thus, inculcation in the ethics of virtue quickly came up against its natural limits. 
While neither heroic ethics nor the aim to achieve personal realisation contradicted 
official ideology, nevertheless the communard educators rebelled against the 
inconsistency of real-life practices with declared ideals – above all, ideals that implied 
a high degree of heroism and altruism. In fact, the official Soviet upbringing inculcated 
children with that which they could hardly apply in reality: specifically, the foundations 
of heroic ethics at a time when the possibility of carrying out any truly heroic deeds 
was almost completely absent. Although the communist education system tried to 
break this deadlock, objectively it created only palliative organisational structures 
along with correspondingly dubious educational practices. As a result of such an 
upbringing, people grew up with a vague longing for heroism, a desire to be members 
of a community welded together by strong friendly relations, as well as a desire to do 
at least something useful for others, in order to bring joy to themselves. Did this make 
them immune to the blandishments of a bourgeois lifestyle? Hardly.
This small shift in emphasis was enough to begin to educate people who 
were notably able to fight for their private interests. On closer examination, such 
attitudes quite closely resemble the contemporary revelations of successful people. 
Counterintuitively, such people are also creative personalities, who enthusiastically 
create and – quite in the spirit of the arguments of the apologists for capitalism – assert 
that they work not for themselves, but for the benefit to others.
Thus, the paradoxicality of the phenomenon of communardism and similar 
movements consisted in the following: the ideological substantiation of the need 
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for communardistic experiments appealed to high humanistic and communist 
ideals that required the cultivation of a versatile personality – not just on the scale 
of narrow social and professional groups, but on the scale of society as a whole. 
Nevertheless, the communard movement led to the formation of communities quite 
far from the high goals articulated from the top floor of the Soviet ethical pyramid. It 
can be seen that, neither in the Soviet Union, nor in the capitalist societies of the 
West, has industrial society matured such as to permit all citizens to become creative 
individuals. Consequently, the Communard experiment was doomed – both by the 
nature of society itself and by the sabotage and opposition of official authorities – 
to break into many local groups formed around individual pedagogical successes, 
leading to the formation of communities welded together almost exclusively by virtue 
ethics. After all, this was more intelligible and comfortable for the participants of such 
groups, who had apparently not seriously considered any values and goals other 
than those corresponding to the interests of local communities or individual creative 
development, who did not strive for anything other than their emotional comfort 
and that of their associates. This paradox was resolved by the gradual reduction 
of communardism to purely pedagogical experiments, which lacked an orientation 
towards changing social reality itself.
Thus, the communard movement was for the most part transformed into a set 
of pedagogical techniques equally appropriate for participants in business trainings 
and totalitarian sects. The overstated self-esteem of these innovators, who only felt 
like something more than business trainers when they were dominated by a formal – 
but ideologically determined – system of values, is even more revealing. This self-
esteem disappeared when the Communards gradually realised that they were merely 
the owners of a certain pedagogical technology: the “centennial communardist cycle” 
has closed, and on a new spiral, we can again see the “original” attempt to create the 
same “new school” that Lev Tolstoy and Stanislav Shatsky also tried to create (see: 
Sokolov, n.d.).
Ultimately, the general vector of the Communard educational experiments boiled 
down to the cultivation of a kind of alternative to official Soviet quasi-class stratification. 
More precisely, it consisted of splitting society into small groups with their own locally 
applicable codes of honour, in which priority was given to the education of the creative 
person and development of personality. The result was a person whose moral 
coordinates were no longer determined either by the moral norms of Soviet quasi-
class stratification or by the high ideals of communism. Nevertheless, while such a 
person might fervently adhere to the internal norms of such small groups for a while, 
an eventual parting of ways was almost inevitable due to a growing unwillingness to 
obey the leader, whose moral authority inevitably eroded over time. However, since 
inculcation was carried out with the aim of forming personality, such a result was 
considered to be a pedagogical success. Perhaps this was indeed so. However, the 
question then arises as to the capabilities of such a person in the context of high 
Soviet morality. He or she was naturally inclined toward a naive struggle for his or 
her own comfort (see: Dragunsky, 2019). The horizon of this person’s ability to create 
social institutions (if we understand the latter as a symbiosis of norms and structures) 
Changing Societies & Personalities, 2020, Vol. 4, No. 3, pp. 372–395 387
consisted in the tendency to unite into common interest groups. On the one hand, such 
a person could not become a committed citizen of a modern society, since already 
or still lacking a conscious commitment to any universal value system. On the other 
hand, he or she could only be involved in the emerging post-Soviet social stratification 
according to his or her outward position in the evolving hierarchy of social groups that 
did not yet have their own corporate codes.
1990s: Moral Non-Catastrophe
Although the abrupt change in the social order resulted in a restructuring of priorities, 
this did not imply a complete moral collapse. Was socialism replaced by capitalism? 
Even if it was not, in many ways, Soviet society had become more bourgeois than 
socialist. Although under the conditions of the Soviet period, bourgeois values 
did not manifest themselves, so to speak, in their purest forms – and while Soviet 
ideology and socialist phraseology condemned and inhibited bourgeois or philistine 
motivations in official life – in real life these latter, of course, dominated (see: Voeikov, 
2015, p. 134). As the significance of the upper stratum of Soviet values decreased, 
consumer discourses strengthened along with a painful sensitivity to the material 
dimension of life, inequalities of consumption and lack of access to scarce goods. 
Meanwhile, a reverse movement was taking place from universal quasi-aristocracy, 
not even to bourgeois values and behaviour, but into new proto-class stratification on 
the basis of professional, corporate and administrative access to resources. Over time, 
the official Soviet project began to lose its ability to coherently define and defend the 
public/state interest, which was increasingly being eroded by private, group, corporate, 
regional, sectoral, republican, and other non-universal interests (Glinchikova, 2011, 
p. 157). Strictly speaking, the expansion and institutionalisation of shadow schemes 
for the exchange of these resources among the nomenklatura and resource crafts 
classes (farmers, speculators, cultural figures, managers of shops and consumer 
goods bases) created those active minorities that later became the fertile soil for the 
emergence of post-Soviet elites.
Of course, various structural changes simultaneously taking place in the 
background played a key role in influencing the transformation of Soviet morality 
and ideology over the 70 years of its existence. The constant complication, 
individualisation and rationalisation of everyday life, especially in cities, increasingly 
reduced the effectiveness of moral regulators of the pseudo-collective type. Along 
with an expansion of the space of differentiated regulation for different spheres of life 
and creeping de-ideologisation, the everyday practices of citizens gradually started to 
lose their connection with the sphere of higher values.
During the period of Stalin’s rule, various critical problems associated with the 
survival and modernisation of Soviet society were being tackled, requiring the exertion 
of all available forces and resources. Due to the existential nature of this effort, it was 
not compatible with dissent or competition between groups of political elites. However, 
by the second half of the 1950s, having succeeded in becoming a world superpower, 
Soviet society began to allow much more freedom, competition, difference of opinion – 
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and even dissent – in the process of expanding the individual freedoms of citizens. 
According to Alexander Shubin, the Soviet social dress of the 1960s and 1970s 
only “didn’t fit too tightly” due to the extreme constrictiveness of the pre-war version. 
In moving into separate apartments, former residents of communal apartments 
experienced a great surge of freedom. In familiarising themselves with the secrets of 
the Stalinist era (albeit only to a limited degree), intellectuals were practically choking 
on freedom. By the 1970s, people were already growing out of such “suits”, and while 
a lack of freedom was being felt more acutely, as we will see, the sphere of freedom 
was actually expanding – it’s just that was expanding more slowly than the need for 
self-expression and results of intellectual questing. Having “dispersed” the growth of 
needs, Soviet society now failed to keep pace with them (see: Shubin, 2008, pp. 8–9).
The most important factor in the devaluation of the highest Soviet values was the 
gradual suspension of the revolutionary impulse underlying them. The evolution of 
the value core of the Soviet project demonstrates a transition from the revolutionary 
phase, in which images were strongly associated with control of the future, to a more 
conservative cultural logic, involving a revision of the position of the Soviet project 
in the value hierarchy of world culture. The sacral centre of the Soviet project was 
under increasing pressure of depoliticisation and profanisation, as a consequence of 
which higher symbols and ideological systems were transformed into material for low 
literary genres, anecdotes and urban legends (Arkhipova & Kirzyuk, 2020). For the 
Soviet political order, the semiotisation of the communist cultural space brings about 
the failure of the legitimising function.
The desacralisation of the highest Soviet values was the result of losing the 
utopian dimension associated with the revolutionary transformation of the world, 
along with the capability to offer hope. In particular, A. Yurchak interprets the 
performative shift taking place in the official Soviet culture of the 1970s–1980s as a 
sign of growing stagnation and crisis. This is a shift from meaningful production and 
discussion of ideological facts and meanings to the reproduction of ritual actions 
and formal linguistic usages, aimed only at confirming the subject’s external loyalty 
to the moral standards/values adopted by the Soviet society. As a result, the living 
language of party disputes and discussions gradually turns into a wooden language, 
a frozen, constantly repeating and awkwardly complex linguistic form (see: Yurchak, 
2014, pp. 72–75). Analogous processes of ossification and formalisation occur in 
diverse areas of culture and art, as well as in the collective practices of social and 
everyday life.
Meanwhile, a decline in the powerful value impulse of communist ideology was 
also occurring due to a proportion of the tasks set by the revolution in late Soviet 
society having been successfully implemented in the social state, transforming utopia 
into part of everyday life, which was supposed to remain the eternal achievement of 
the working people. However, the implementation of these values – for example, in 
the form of the Soviet social state – simultaneously became their profanation, since 
they became part of everyday Soviet life, which, since apparently established forever, 
no longer needed any additional value justification. At the same time, another of the 
highest axiological components of the Soviet project, which related to the global 
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expansion of socialism as the more progressive and humane social system, failed to 
receive historical confirmation and began to be emasculated in the form of pedestrian 
plans by Nikita Khrushchev to catch up with the United States in the per capita 
production of meat, milk, pig iron and various other goods.
As a result, late Soviet society gradually began to transform into a society 
without utopias, in which the hopes, aims and opportunities of citizens began to find 
their ideological justification at the lower levels of the value hierarchy. The ideas of 
revolution, cosmopolitanism, the class struggle and transformation of mankind finally 
gave way to various ethics of virtue under the conditions of developed socialism, 
which naturally began to fall into a state of stagnation. It is evident that the expanding 
autonomy of lower-level values led to a strengthening of corresponding shadow 
networks and institutions for the distribution of public resources. Thus, the logical 
next step was that they would start to present a challenge to the highest ideological 
values and institutions. As a result, perestroika, although aimed at reviving the 
highest Soviet political values (democratisation, transparency, acceleration, self-
government), turned into a final defeat of these values, due to the gaining confidence 
of non-Soviet social groups interested in changing the entire political economic 
order and its moral foundations.
What actually happened in the 1990s? It is appropriate to consider the situation in 
the field of public morality of the 1990s as resulting from the extemporary dominance 
of the ethics of virtue, as a result of the re-actualisation of those values, virtues and 
personality patterns that had hitherto played a subordinate role in the integral structure 
of Soviet morality. Nevertheless, it was the presence of such values, on the one hand, 
that prevented the moral catastrophe from being as total as it appeared to many during 
the 1990s, and, on the other, ensured moral continuity between the past and the 
future. For the later Soviet generations, the morality formed by the October Revolution 
and Great Patriotic War, which “would live a native country, and there are no other 
worries”, was already being gradually superseded by the ethical priorities of concern 
for oneself and the environment. Following the collapse of the USSR, this long-term 
trend of moral de-universalisation would continue, albeit in a more consistent and 
legitimate form. Moreover, the active value transformation in the post-Soviet period 
was carried out mainly in private life, with surprisingly little effect on the public sphere 
as an area of common life, now freed from the highest communist values of the Soviet 
project: the growth of diversity and individualism primarily characterises the private 
sphere, consumption and everyday practices, while the symbolic sphere remains as 
if frozen (see: Volkenstein, 2018). This trend is also confirmed by the strengthening 
of symbolic policies aimed at appropriating the highest achievements of the USSR, 
since current Russian politics, being saturated with virtue ethics, are not capable of 
providing consolidating moral models at this level.
Although, during the reform process, society turned out to have disintegrated, 
with Soviet collectives disbanding and the level of mutual trust and trust in state and 
social institutions having significantly decreased (Martianov, 2017), nevertheless this 
disintegration still had not reached the stage of complete atomisation or individualisation. 
People remained friends and classmates, colleagues and allies in shared struggles, 
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as well as continuing to be part of families and other small communities. The latter 
were held together by bonds of mutual fidelity, comprising the main elements of virtue 
ethics, which, in appealing to the best aspects of human nature represented by heroic 
values, justified the struggle for their own. Ultimately, it appears as if the presence 
of high moral values inherited from the Soviet era not only failed, in some cases, to 
prevent people from participating in the Great Criminal Revolution, but can even to 
seen to have prompted it. Participation in various criminal or quasi-criminal groups, 
in essence, required the same moral qualities as those pertaining to the idols of 
millions of Soviet boys, those musketeers, pirates, noble robbers, adventurers, rebels, 
revolutionaries and other similar heroes who populated classic literature, folklore and 
cinema. Finally, it should be emphasised that the criminal culture of the 1990s did not 
appear from scratch, but continued the rich traditions of Soviet criminal subculture, 
whose actual dimensions were concealed for ideological purposes along with the 
increasing late Soviet statistics on crime and suicide (Rakitin, 2016).
Is it any wonder that people of the sufficiently numerous subculture of traders 
not only responded tolerantly to the criminal revolution of the 1990s, but even took 
to it like a fish to water? However, as we can see, this new way life was not so very 
far from the old, being similarly regulated by various codes and rules of the criminal 
world. Therefore, it would be an exaggeration to state that the loss of universal moral 
values led to total moral relativism, which is determined by a situation where people 
are primarily guided by internal corporate standards. It is the clear correspondence 
of such norms with the equivalent norms of other corporations in a classless society 
(Fishman & Martianov, 2016) that allows both moral communication and the existence 
of something like a social contract.
In the late USSR, the flip side of Soviet values was a generalised image of 
the West taking the form of a consumer paradise, all the power of its advertising 
being used to destroy the habitual Soviet asceticism, which had failed to take 
account of everyday life, the comfort and amenities of the private life world against 
the background of the movement towards communism in the discourse of the total 
liberation of mankind. Thus, the Great Criminal Revolution was fed by the energy 
of the destruction of the Soviet value core. It was widely believed that its collapse 
would in itself lead to the triumph of universal values that had already taken place 
in the imaginary West. However, no natural value transition occurred; instead, the 
1990s came to function as a magical negative mirror used by the political regime 
of 2000s–2010s to obtain legitimacy from its converse. Thus, the political elites are 
effectively selling a bear market by presenting extremely mundane, pragmatic and 
contradictory values to form a populist patchwork quilt (Martianov, 2007). However, 
they did not propose a new stable value hierarchy, structuring ideas of the common 
good and taking a form capable of supporting a big society. As a result, the symbolic 
transition from liberal-market to sovereign-patriotic rhetoric only strengthened 
the corporate, rentier social structure, in which all the basic characteristics of 
neo-patrimonial political elites, including management methods and opaque 
regimes of ownership, have yet to undergo qualitative axiological and ontological 
transformations over the course of post-Soviet history.
Changing Societies & Personalities, 2020, Vol. 4, No. 3, pp. 372–395 391
Conclusion
The prospects for further moral transformation seem limited and ambiguous. On 
the one hand, collective disappointment in the once-idealised West is growing 
inexorably. On the other hand, the Russian political order has not been able to 
offer a strong institutional and axiological framework for the just and universal 
integration of values. In the absence of a common system of higher values, the 
radical individualism of the majority of Russian citizens prevents them from creating 
effective structures of collective action capable of supporting a big society. There 
is a poorly-reflected public demand for a change in the subjects of collective value-
institutional regulation when, in the place of their big hierarchy there were only 
strong grassroots social connections (family, work collective, neighbours, etc.). 
In such a situation, the observed growth of individualism turns out to be in many 
respects an inductive mechanism revealing the impossibility of institutional trust and 
reliance on stable collective structures – including the state, which has ceased to 
guarantee fundamental ideological constants that structure the common existence 
of its citizens. An increase in the diversity of behavioural patterns, social norms 
and identities, as well as types of interaction and practices, does not lead to an 
expansion of available opportunities, but rather appears as a necessary means of 
adapting individual citizens to the new social order. As a result, local values derived 
from virtue ethics continue to prevail in the form of competitive individualism, as 
implemented within corporate-class communities. Accordingly, social innovations 
often conceal the archaic survival practices of various itinerant workers and 
migrants, placed in an updated technological setting. The lack of universal values 
confirms the specific rentier character of modern Russian society, which is yet to 
develop a moral alternative to the interests of key social groups that came to power 
during the Criminal Revolution (Fishman, Martianov, & Davydov, 2019). In universal 
public spaces supported by the state and having common goals defined by official 
discourses, social groups cease to interact with each other. The collapse of Soviet 
society resulted in the possibility for other groups, classes and corporations to 
become effectively invisible, even when occupying the same urban space. Delimited 
by a variety of local rules and social codes, such collective entities construct their 
communications topologically as disjoint or extremely mediated. Due to being 
limited by self-sufficient corporate interests in the new space of rentier hierarchy and 
intergroup differentiation, society acquires more and more blind spots, preventing 
the emergence of a general relevant picture from any one collective position.
In fact, in the 1990s and partly in the 2000s, the majority did not experience 
catastrophic moral discomfort concerning the lack of universally valid values that went 
beyond the ethics of virtue. Following the collapse of the two-level Soviet morality, 
society switched to an emergency mode of regulation by peripheral and auxiliary 
values, which became established as the new working norm. At first, the authorities 
felt some discomfort in this connection, since from the top down there were notions 
to formulate something like a national idea or nationwide value system that should 
appear organically. In any case, the national idea was considered as a domestic 
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invariant of the liberal, democratic, Western idea – in a word, universal. However, over 
time, in view of the objectively evolving realities of a neo-classist society, its essential 
axiological banality and class-corporate boundedness at the ideological level led to 
the effective rejection of this claim. Thus, the political order prevailing in the decade 
2000–2010 was forced to distance itself from the liberal universalist principles and 
foundations proclaimed during the 1990s.
It became evident that the search by the new elites for a system of common values 
combining alternative-liberal ideas with a Soviet heritage came to a standstill, becoming 
an extracurricular activity or traditional national entertainment in the expression of 
Vladimir Putin. Even when the need to consolidate society around common values is 
actualised for some reason, it is still necessary to try to satisfy it by issuing universal 
versions of various local values: whether structured by Orthodox Christianity (to the 
extent that it is identified with culture and tradition) or located directly in family- or 
traditional values and patriotism. Consecutive attempts by political elites to simulate 
the higher echelons of post-Soviet morality, imitating the form of the external moral 
discourse on behalf of the Russian Orthodox Church, have not met with any obvious 
success. The latter is seen as too biased in the public space, raising many questions 
regarding the application of double standards in moral assessments of contemporary 
realities of political life. Thus, religious institutions and major Russian denominations 
are used in a technical sense by the Kremlin to legitimise the political regime albeit, but 
without significant institutional and moral autonomy (Stepanova, 2019).
Against this background, insistent attempts to legitimise the new Russian elites 
in terms of the Soviet project are turning into a symbolic appropriation of the highest 
achievements of the USSR, accompanied by a careful removal and suppression of the 
ideological values that underlie these achievements. The latter is not surprising, since 
Soviet big society values directly contradict the currently dominant rentier model. The 
formation of truly new big society values, on the other hand, implies serious social 
transformations, suggesting a critical reflection on the rentier and corporate values 
and practices of Russian political elites. However, the political discourses circulating 
in public space are unable to solve the principal problems associated with a genuine 
understanding of the society in which we live; all the more so when it comes to providing 
a justification of the highest values for this society. Therefore, even if the need to seek 
an axiological alternative to the Big Soviet Society is proclaimed, this quest inevitably 
becomes frozen halfway. It boils down, in essence, to a single protracted attempt to 
reformulate a class ethic of virtue in such a way that it becomes suitable for the moral 
nurturing of a big society. How productive such a strategy could be and how soon 
it would cease to satisfy both the top and bottom social echelons is a question that 
deserves a separate study.
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